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1. Introduction
Recent studies of the world’s ocean fisheries identify a pattern of biological and economic
decline. The list of problems include overfishing and serial stock depletion,1 waste from
discards of unwanted fish species,2 and potentially irreversible alteration of ocean ecosys-
tem function caused by excessive fishing pressure on high trophic-level species (Pauly et al.
1998).3
Management problems that arise due to the common property nature of fisheries’ re-
sources are well documented (Gordon, 1954; Munro, and Scott, 1996). Management diﬃ-
culties have more recently been linked to a reliance on single-species management principles
which ignore complex biological interactions found in real world fisheries.4 A particular
fallout of the single-species approach is the bycatch problem, i.e., unintended harvest, dis-
card, and thus mortality of non-target fish species. FAO (2005) estimates that 8% of all
harvested fish worldwide is discarded at sea. In US fisheries, discards of non-target species
are estimated as high as 22% of total harvest (Harrington et al., 2005). In response to the
perceived severity of the bycatch problem, the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-
ministration’s National Marine Fisheries Service has launched a National Bycatch Strategy
which includes a standardized bycatch reporting program, a bycatch reduction engineering
program, on-board observer programs to monitor bycatch, and a host of regulatory actions
(gear restrictions, area closures, bycatch quotas and trip limits) designed to reduce discards
of non-target species (Benaka and Dobrzynski, 2004).5
This paper demonstrates how economies of scope in fish harvesting create an incentive
to discard fish under commonly practiced regulations that aim to address common pool
problems in fisheries. We further show how scope economies alter optimal harvest policies
and rent generation under such regulations.
The scope economies we consider characterize most if not all fisheries. Gear used to
1Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) estimates that 25% of major fish stocks worldwide are over-
exploited, depleted or recovering from depletion; 52% are fully exploited, and 23% are under or moderately
exploited (FAO, 2006). Serial stock depletion refers to a pattern of pushing farther and farther oﬀ shore to
find undepleted fish stocks.
2FAO estimates that 8% of the worldwide fish harvest is of non-target species, also called bycatch, that
is subsequently discarded at sea (FAO, 2005; Harrington et al., 2005).
3The trophic level refers to the position that an organism occupies in a food chain. Pauly et al. (1998)
raise concerns about the ecological impacts of a global trend that they call fishing down food webs, i.e.,
harvesting top predators first, and then turning sequentially to lower trophic level species.
4A growing view among fisheries scientists and marine ecologists is that a more holistic approach will
improve the management of ocean fisheries resources (Brodziak and Link, 2002; Pikitch et al., 2004; Pew
Oceans Commission, 2003; US Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004).
5Recent statistics however raise serious doubts regarding the success of observer program in stemming
the bycatch problem. For example, in the US west coast ground fish fishery, approximately 66.8% of the
catch of “overfished” species — the stocks that managers have been trying to rebuild — was discarded into
the sea in 2004 (Hastie and Bellman, 2006).
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capture fish (e.g., nets, baited hooks, fish traps) regularly intercepts multiple fish species.
The technology intrinsically embodies an economy of scope and produces a mix of species
that depends on the absolute as well as the relative abundance of various species in the
sea. Fishermen can target a particular species mix by employing diﬀerent gear types at
diﬀerent locations, times of the year, times of the day, and depths.6 However, targeting
entails additional costs that fishermen, in general, will prefer to avoid.
In contrast to the above description of the harvesting technology, research on multiple
species fisheries management has featured two extreme technological assumptions: cross-
species cost independence (i.e., costless targeting of individual species) or, harvest in fixed-
proportions to the relative abundance of stocks in the sea (i.e., no ability to target, or infinite
targeting costs). These studies typically derive steady state harvest rules in competing
species or predator and prey fisheries and show how harvest such policies respond to various
specifications of ecological interaction and/or to other parametric changes in the model
(May et al., 1979; Clark, 1990; Flaaten 1991, 1998; Boyce, 1996; and Brown et al., 2005).
Moreover, the static nature of these results are of not much use to the regulators interested in
optimal rebuilding of depleted stocks. By definition, rebuilding plans can only be examined
in dynamic frameworks.7
This paper extends the multiple-species bioeconomics literature in two directions. First,
we dispense with the unrealistic extremes of technical independence or fixed-proportion catch
across harvest of multiple species. Fishermen who target one of several fish species undertake
costly actions to search out concentrations of the target species and/or take costly actions
to avoid intercepting non-target species. Conversely, a strategy that involves no targeting
eﬀorts by the fisherman and therefore incurs no targeting costs will yield a particular harvest
mix that will depend on the relative abundance of individual species stocks in the sea. To
capture the unique form of scope economies in fisheries, we introduce a technology that links
the harvest of multiple species to the composition of the in situ fish stock. In our framework,
harvest costs rise as the fisherman’s targeted harvest vector diverges from a no-target-cost
harvest that is dictated by the relative abundance of stocks in the sea.8 We allow for stock
6Commercial reef fish fishermen in the Gulf of Mexico target members of the reef fish complex by adjusting
the location, timing and depth of fishing (Donald Waters and David Walker, personal communication,
2004). Pacific halibut longline fishermen can avoid sablefish by choosing particular sites, fishing in deeper
water, and using larger hooks with salmon for bait instead of squid (Arne Lee and Paul Clampitt, personal
communication, 2006). See Branch (2004) for further discussion and evidence of targeting behavior in
Canadian and US west coast groundfish fisheries.
7The bioeconomics literature is largely silent on the determination of optimal approaches to the multiple-
species steady states. Clark (1990) suggests that a “practical approach path” be chosen. Our analysis finds
that identifying a practical approach to the steady state is not trivial.
8Turner (1995, 1997) recognized that fishermen can influence the mix of harvested species in a multiple-
species fishery, but did not consider the role of stock abundance or its implications for dynamic management.
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eﬀects such that the resources required to harvest a unit of fish decline when stocks are more
abundant. While “public” factors of production e.g., boats, gear, and labor create scope
economies in the standard manner, the product mix in our technology is dictated by the
relative abundance of the various species stocks.9 It is this latter source of scope economies
that is unique to fishing technologies.
Second, we numerically solve a dynamic multiple-species management problem in a model
fishery that combines the above inter-species technological interactions with a Lotka-Volterra
model of inter- and intraspecies ecological interaction (see Pianka, 1974). The harvest policies
are dictated by scope economies implicit in the harvesting technology as well as the ecological
interactions among multiple fish species. The novelty here is that the optimal harvest choices
not only weigh current harvest returns against future stock benefits, but they also impinge
on future scope economies through changes in relative stock abundance.
Important insights for the management of multiple species fisheries emerge. We show
that at sea discards by fishermen arise when the individual-species harvest goal set by the
regulator diverges suﬃciently from the no-target-cost harvest mix. In such cases, fishermen
can avoid targeting costs required to meet the regulator’s harvest goal and simply discard
any overages that cannot be legally landed.
We then study the problem of regulating the harvest of multiple fish species under a
costly targeting technology. Three alternative regulatory schemes are examined, namely,
tradable harvest rights in the form of species-specific quotas, landings taxes, and a revenue
quota introduced by Turner (1995); the first two are susceptible to discards, whereas the
third, by design, rules out discards. Quotas or landings taxes do not fully align divergent
goals of autonomous fishermen and the regulator in the presence of unobserved discarding.
As a result, these instruments do not achieve the first best outcome; we show how each
regulatory instrument can achieve a “second best” management outcome.
We first identify harvest targets that are implementable when at sea discards are not ob-
served. We employ a numerical dynamic optimization technique to compute the second best
management policies by constraining the manager to choose from the set of implementable
harvest targets only. Our results show that, in general, management constraints tend to be
most pronounced, and thus the potential for discarding most severe, when the no-target-cost
harvest mix and the regulator’s preferred harvest mix diverge. Therefore, the second-best
harvest policies trade oﬀ an ecologically desirable harvest, e.g., highest yield, against the
9Public factors, once acquired for use in production of a good, are available costlessly for use in the
production of other goods. Subadditive fixed costs refer to a situation where the sum of fixed costs required
to produce multiple goods in separate firms exceeds the fixed cost requirement to produce the same bundle
within a single firm (see Baumol, et al. 1982). Squires (1987), and others, study the eﬀects of "standard"
scope economies in fisheries management.
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mix that minimizes targeting costs. The yield-target cost trade-oﬀ leads to harvest policies
that substantially depart from conventional conservation principles, as demonstrated by our
numerical results.
To understand this trade-oﬀ, consider for example a fishery with two competing species.
Suppose one species has been overfished while the other is abundant. Ecological consider-
ations, and conservation principles, suggest that to rebuild the depleted stock its harvest
must be substantially reduced or stopped altogether, while to mitigate inter-species compe-
tition the harvest of the healthy stock must be increased. Our results show that a mismatch
between harvest shares set by the regulator and the no-targeting-cost mix facing fishermen
can undermine this rebuilding strategy. If the target catch of the abundant species is set
too high, or the target catch of the depleted species is set too low, fishing mortality of the
overfished stock can remain high. The mismatch between the regulator’s harvest goal and
the no-target-cost mix raises costs for fishermen introducing an incentive to intercept and
discard the overfished species at sea.
Optimal rebuilding may instead require only modest reduction in the harvest of depleted
stock, which allows a higher harvest of the abundant species and reduced inter-species eco-
logical competition. Thus, the depleted stock can be rebuilt by manipulating ecological
interactions rather than through costly reductions in harvest levels and wasteful at-sea dis-
carding. As the optimal rebuilding plan depends on the flexibility allowed by a particular
regulatory regime, for each regime we compute second-best plans that simultaneously balance
ecological and technical trade-oﬀs.
It is worth emphasizing that none of the regulatory regimes we consider can manage the
fishery as a hypothetical sole owner. In particular, the sole owner may sometimes choose
harvest targets that under decentralized regulation lead to discards by fishermen. In the
absence of discarding and the problem of harvest slacks, the latter being the case in which
fishermen choose to harvest less than the regulator’s target, the sole owner harvest targets
can be implemented simply by setting species-specific quotas at the optimal harvest levels.
But such quotas may not be implementable now as the manager faces a hidden-action (unob-
servable discarding) problem. As a result, all three regulatory regimes are welfare-dominated
by the optimal plans of a sole owner. While ranking the three, we show that landing taxes
welfare dominate species-specific quotas while value-based quotas fare the worst.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the costly targeting technology
and presents the dynamic model of the multi-species fishery. Section 3 characterizes fish-
ermen’s incentives to discard under three alternative regulatory instruments. Solutions to
the sole owner’s problem as well as the constrained-management problem, along with their
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welfare rankings, are presented in section 4. Regime-specific numerical results are presented
in section 5. Section 6 provides concluding remarks and discusses some implications of the
model for the design of multiple species fisheries management policy.
2. Model
We consider a fishery that is exploited over an infinite number of discrete time periods.
To simplify the analysis each period is divided into a stock growth phase and a harvesting
phase. No harvesting occurs during the growth phase, and no growth occurs during the
harvest phase. Stock abundance is assumed to be fixed during the harvesting phase, which
allows us to treat the stock abundance simply as a constraint on harvest possibilities. The
timing of events is as follows:
There are two sources of species interaction in our model. First, harvesting costs will
not only depend on the quantity of harvested species and stock abundance, but also on
the mix of harvested species relative to the mix of stock abundance. The latter captures
the real world feature that intercepting a mix of species that is substantially diﬀerent than
their relative abundance requires extra eﬀorts and is therefore costlier. Second, ecological
interdependence among individual species results from competition for scarce habitat, and/or
predation among fish species. We first discuss the harvest technology. Presentation of the
stock growth model follows.
2.1. Harvest technology. Let x ∈ Rm+ denote the stock of m species available at the
beginning of an arbitrary harvest phase and let z ∈ Rn+ denote an n-vector of inputs, for
example, labor, capital, bait, and fuel, that is allocated to harvest. The harvest vector is
denoted by h ∈ Rm+ .
The harvesting technology determines feasible combinations of inputs, outputs and stock
levels. Let H (z, x) denote a harvest possibilities set: H (z, x) = {h : z can harvest h given
x}, where h ∈ H(z, x) implies that, given stock abundance x, input z can intercept and land
the vector h = (h1, h2, ..., hm). H(z, x) is assumed to be closed, bounded, and nonempty for
z > 0, x > 0. We assume further that H(z, x) ⊇ H(ez, x) for ez ≥ z and H(z, x) ⊇ H(z, ηx)
for η ≥ 1; the harvest possibilities set does not contract with increased inputs or proportional
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Figure 1: Multiple species harvest sets under cost targeting technologies.
increases in stock abundance. In future, for a given z and x, we denote H (z, x) simply by
H.
Multiple-species stock eﬀects. For any given fishing technology and inputs em-
ployed, harvest possibilities in a multi-species fishery crucially depend on the composition
of the available fish stock. Targeting a single species for example entails costly avoidance of
other species. These costs in turn depend on the degree of targeting flexibility embedded in
the technology. Turner (1995, 1997) recognized that costly targeting of individual fish species
can be represented with a weak output disposability technology. Weak output disposability
is often used to characterize technologies that produce both desirable and undesirable out-
puts, and for which disposal of the undesirable outputs utilizes valued factors of production
(see Färe et al. (1994) for additional discussion). In the current context, weak output dis-
posability reflects the fact that valued factors of production are utilized in preventing the
fishing gear from intercepting non-target fish species. Figure 1 demonstrates this property
for a two-species fishery example.
Panel (a) in Figure 1 depicts harvest sets for two example technologies, denoted by
superscripts 1 and 2.10 Harvest sets in panel (a) are conditional upon a common input
bundle, z, and are conditional on common stock abundance, x. Stock abundance in panel
10Observe that, as the set of inputs and therefore the cost of production is fixed along the frontiers, the
harvest possibilities curves essentially represent iso-cost curves. It should be noted that there is no reason
to expect that, for a given input bundle, the harvest frontiers under technologies oﬀering diﬀerent flexibility
will be tangential to one another (point c in panel (a), point d in panel (b)). The figure depicts special
examples only for expositional convenience.
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(b) diﬀers and is discussed below. Each harvest set exhibits weak output disposability
but varies in terms of the flexibility with which the mix of species can be adjusted by the
fisherman.
Under technology 1, as exhibited by H1, specialization, i.e., zero catch of one species and
strictly positive catch of the other, is possible but costly. Since the input vector is fixed, the
cost of targeting is reflected as foregone harvest. A fisherman who wishes to specialize in
the harvest of species 1 fish (and chooses h2 = 0) can harvest at most eh1. Under diversified
harvesting however the catch of both species can increase, for example to point c. Intuitively,
specialization is costly because resources are used in searching for high concentrations of one
particular species and/or in ensuring that the other species is not intercepted by the fishing
gear.
With technology 2, as exhibited by harvest set H2, zero harvest of one species is possible
only if the harvest of the other species is also zero; specialization is ruled out. Notice that
targeting under technology 2 is generally more costly than under technology 1.
It is instructive to contrast the weak output disposability technology with fixed pro-
portions and independent harvesting technology assumptions which dominate the multiple-
species fishery literature. Under a fixed-proportions technology adjustments to the mix of
harvested species is not possible. Assuming eﬃciency in production, this technology can be
represented simply as point c in Figure 1. Under fixed proportions, the fishermen can adjust
the scale of production only. At the other extreme, technological independence across har-
vested species, or a non joint-in-inputs technology, implies the existence of species-specific
harvest functions, i.e., neither economies nor diseconomies of scope.
The single-species bioeconomics literature treats the fish stock as a normal production
input; harvest is assumed a non-decreasing function of stock abundance (see Clark, 1990;
Smith 1968). With multiple species, however, the eﬀect of stock increases on the harvest
frontier is less clear. If no steps are taken to target any one species (or avoid another), it is
reasonable to expect that the mix of species intercepted by the fishing gear will positively
depend on the composition of the stock (Mayo et al., 1981; Murawski, 1984). In what follows,
we assume that targeting costs are lowest, in fact zero, when harvest shares are equal to
stock shares. 11 More precisely, given stock abundance x, a harvest vector h with individual
species shares hi/
Pm
i=1 hi that are proportional to stock abundance shares, xi/
Pm
i=1 xi, is
likely to require the fewest targeting inputs. On the other hand, more targeting inputs will
11This assumption is merely to simplify the analysis. In general, when a fishing strategy does not involve
added targeting eﬀort, its propensity to intercept species a more than species b will positively depend on a’s
abundance relative to b. See Appendix for details.
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be required to harvest a mix of species that diﬀers from the mix of individual species stocks.
This suggests that the shape of the harvest possibilities set must depend on both absolute
and relative abundance of the individual species stocks.
To further illustrate the implications of costly targeting, consider (h, x) such that hi/
Pm
i=1 hi =
xi/
Pm
i=1 xi for all i. Holding h fixed, consider an alternative stock vector bx where bx1 > x1
and bxj = xj for j = 2, 3, ..,m. It is conceivable that more targeting inputs will be re-
quired to harvest h since the fisherman must take measures to avoid the now more abundant
species 1 fish. This suggests that, contrary to the assumption in the single-species literature,
monotonicity between the harvest and the stock may not hold globally.
Returning to Figure 1, Panel (b) illustrates the hypothesized eﬀect of an increase in
the relative abundance of the species 1 stock. In our example, H1, and H2 in panel (b)
are conditional on the common input bundle z (unchanged from panel (a)) but new stock
abundance satisfying ex1/ex2 > x1/x2. For each harvest set, the feasible h1 is increased relative
to h2 reflecting the increase in relative abundance of the species 1 stock. Lastly, we note
that under a fixed-proportions technology, the harvest would be fixed at point d with the
share of h1 in the catch increased due again to the relative increase in the species 1 stock.
The discard set. If a fisherman chooses to discard fish at sea, landed fish will be less
than h. We assume that the act of discarding fish at sea is costless and that the mortality
rate of discarded fish is 100%.12 This second assumption simplifies the notation allowing us
to equate the harvest with fishing mortality.
To characterize the incentive to discard fish at sea, we first define the eﬃcient harvest
set as
He = {h ∈ H(z, x) : eh > h ⇒ eh /∈ H(z, x)}.
Thus, if h ∈ He it is not possible to increase the catch of any individual species without
reducing the catch of some other species.
Refer to the harvest set H(z, x) in Figure 2. The eﬃcient set He is shown as the segment
bc. Elements of He satisfy the condition that the marginal rate of product transformation
between any two species is non-positive. In contrast, for all other points along the boundary
(or isoquant) of H(z, x) that are not in He the rate of product transformation between two
species is positive.
12Arnason (1994) introduces a model in which discarding fish at sea adds costs. It is true that sorting a
multiple species catch can be costly. However, since fish is marketed by species (and sometimes by weight
class), the catch must be sorted regardless of whether it is landed or discarded. Discarding fish after sorting
involves tossing it overboard rather than into a vessel fish hold, which would seem to add little additional
cost. In this context, our assumption of costless discarding does not seem unrealistic.
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Figure 2: Discarding under weak output disposibility.
Assuming nonnegative prices for landed fish, profits can only decline if intercepted fish
is discarded at sea. Then h ∈ He is a necessary condition for profit maximization in the
absence of any regulation. Under certain regulations, however, discarding fish at sea can
increase private fishing profits. To see this, suppose that in response to conservation goals
the fishery manager attempts to regulate catch at h =
©
h1, h2
ª
in Figure 2. Notice that h is
an element of H(z, x) but not He(z, x). The inputs required to intercept h are z. As shown
in the figure, inputs that would otherwise be allocated to targeting activities can be saved by
intercepting a mix of species that more closely mirrors the relative stock abundance. These
input savings are exhausted at
©
h1 + d1, h2
ª
∈ He(ez, x), with ez < z.
Generalizing the above, we can define a discard set as the set of (regulated) harvest
vectors for which fishermen can reduce harvesting costs by discarding fish at sea:
D(z, x) = {h : h ∈ H(z, x), h /∈ He(z, x)}
Dual representation. Harvest technologies exhibiting weak output disposability can-
not be represented with single-valued production or transformation functions (Diewert,
1973). To facilitate analysis of the dynamic management problem (Section 4) we adopt
a dual representation of the costly targeting technology. We define the cost function as
c(w, h, x) = min
z
{w0z|h ∈ H(z, x)},
where w denotes a n-vector of strictly positive fixed unit input prices. We assume that the
cost function is non-decreasing and linearly homogeneous in w. It bears emphasis that the
cost function is defined over intercepted fish (harvest), as opposed to landed fish.
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The weak output disposability property of the underlying technology implies that harvest
costs are not everywhere increasing in catch h. Figure 2 for example shows that costs decline
as h1 is increased from
©
h1, h2
ª
to
©
h1 + d1, h2
ª
. The implication is that for h ∈ D(z, x) the
marginal cost is negative for at least one harvested species. We can define the (dual) discard
set as
D (w, x) = {h : ∂c(w, h, x)/∂hi < 0 for some i} .
In future, we let ci ≡ ∂c/∂hi. Inputs prices are assumed fixed, and to ease notation are
hereafter suppressed.
The following cost function, which we utilize for our exercises in Section 5, captures the
weak output disposability property in a two species fishery (a more general version of the
following cost function appears in an appendix equation (7)):
c (h, x) =
"
1 +
1
2
γs
µ
h1
h1 + h2
− x1
x1 + x2
¶2#∙γ1
x1
hη1 +
γ2
x2
hη2
¸
; γs, γ1 , γ2 > 0, η > 1. (1)
This cost function leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Fix h1 = h¯1. Then for any given x1, x2 > 0, there exists hˆ2 < h¯1 x2x1 such
that for all h2 < hˆ2, c2 < 0, i.e., the harvest vector
n
h¯1, h2 < hˆ2
o
falls in the discard set.
Proof. See Appendix 8.1.
Proposition 1 makes clear that any regulations that set harvests at
©
h¯1, h¯2
ª
with h¯2 < hˆ2,
will provide incentives to discard species 2 fish. Moreover, the threshold hˆ2 depends on the
permissible harvest for species 1 as well as the relative abundance of the two stocks. An
observation of the cost function in (1) clarifies that the result stated in Proposition (1) holds
symmetrically for both species.
The cost function expressed by (1) requires some further elaboration. While γ1 and γ2
are scale parameters, the stock terms in the denominators within the second square brackets
ensure that a higher stock abundance of any species reduces its own harvesting cost; η > 1
helps in ensuring that marginal costs are increasing in harvest levels. Finally, γs captures
the degree of targeting flexibility permitted by the technology. If γs = 0, the harvest of
the two species are independent of each other and the cost function reduces to the standard
Schaefer model (see, for example, Brown et al. (2005)). At the other extreme, as γs →∞,
the cost function represents a fixed proportions technology.13
13One may object to our description of targeting costs as too simplistic. Modeling targeting costs that
symmetrically penalize deviations between harvest and stock shares however comes naturally to mind. Em-
pirical investigation could determine alternate specification that provide a closer approximation to real world
targeting costs. It is easy to conjecture that as long as targeting costs rise with the diﬀerence between catch
and stock shares, the results that follow will qualitatively remain unaltered.
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It bears emphasis that the above technological representation is introduced in terms of
aggregate stock and harvest levels. Fisheries are typically exploited by many fishing firms. To
simplify analysis and avoid introducing additional firm-level notation, we assume that there
exists a continuum of identical fishermen uniformly distributed in [0, 1], and each endowed
with an identical harvesting technology. This allows us to consider the decision problem
of a representative fisherman. Moreover, under this construct, per-fisherman and aggregate
outcomes coincide in equilibrium.14
2.2. Stock growth. We assume the following Lotka-Volterra stock growth model:
x0i = s
0
i + ris
0
i
Ã
1− s0i −
X
j 6=i
αijs0j
!
, i = 1, ...,m. (2)
Recall that in our model the growth phase precedes the harvest phase. In the above ex-
pression s0i ≡ xi − hi denotes species i escapement at the end of the current harvest phase
(equivalently, the beginning of the next period); x0i denotes its stock abundance at the be-
ginning of next period. The parameter ri reflects the intrinsic growth for species i, and αij
represents inter-species competition. Positive values for αij indicate that species i and j
compete with one another for common and limited resources, whereas a negative value for
αij indicates that species i is a predator of species j.
3. Implementable choices under alternative regulatory regimes
In this section, we study common regulations used to address ineﬃciencies in open access
fisheries. We assume that fishermen’s actions-at-sea are unobservable to the manager of the
fishery, who can only observe the fish landed at the port, and therefore can not penalize
discards at sea. Our goal is to identify cases under which the harvest levels chosen by
fishermen diverge from the harvest goal selected by the manager.
We assume that the fishermen’s objective is to maximize current period fishing profits. If
the fishermen did not discard fish, landings and catch coincide and the manager can control
catch through landings. However, with a harvesting technology that exhibits weak output
disposability, catch and landings are not identical if the manager’s landings’ target falls in
14In general, if the technology is not CRTS a representative agent set up may not be appropriate and an
additional entry condition may be required. However, if the mass of agents is exogenously fixed, as long as
all the individuals make positive profits no one will exit. Indeed, with diminishing returns to scale, and in
the absence of fixed costs, the profits are always positive and the equilibrium number of agents with free
entry is infinite. If instead the number of fishermen is fixed at a large number, all of them will be active.
Fixing the mass of these agents at unity essentially allows us to avoid diﬀerentiating between per unit and
aggregate outcomes. The results will not change if instead the number of agents is fixed at a finite large
number and the cost function is appropriately reparameterized.
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the discard set. The question we ask here is: how shall the manager regulate harvest when
discarding by fishermen is unobservable?
The answer will depend on the regulatory instrument used to implement the manager’s
harvest goal. Two forms of regulation common in the natural resources literature will be
examined: landings taxes and individual or species-specific harvest quotas. A third less com-
mon regulatory instrument that we consider is a value-based revenue quota, which has been
proposed as a way to address the discarding problem in multiple-species fisheries (Turner,
1997). Below, each of these instruments is studied sequentially.
3.1. Species-specific quotas. Under this form of regulation, the manager in every pe-
riod issues species-specific landing permits that grant their owner an exclusive right to inter-
cept and land specified quantities of fish. The manager can adjust these quotas to implement
the desired aggregate harvest. We show that under this system fishing mortality, i.e., landings
plus discards, can diverge from the target harvest either through discards at sea, or through
slacks under which fishermen choose not to fully utilize their quotas. In what follows, we
continue to denote the total catch (and fishing mortality) by h, but to make a distinction
between catch and landings, the latter are now denoted by l; the quantity discarded at sea
is denoted by d. Therefore, h ≡ l + d.
Suppose that the landings are regulated such that li ≤ l¯i, where l¯i is the landings quota for
species i. The profit maximization problem for a landings quota—constrained representative
fisherman can be described as
π(p, x, l¯) = max
0≤l≤l¯, d≥0
{p · l − c(l + d, x)},
where p ∈ Rm denotes the vector of dockside prices for landed fish (vector conformability
is assumed). It is worth noticing that the price of some species is allowed to be negative.
These species will not be landed by fishermen; if caught, will be discarded. On the other
hand, fixing a positive landing amount for such species is meaningless; such quotas will never
be utilized. The following proposition summarizes the properties of a discarding equilibrium
under this form of regulation.
Proposition 2. (i) Under a species-specific quota regime, discarding of species i occurs,
that is h∗i > l∗i = l¯i, if and only if c∗i = 0. (ii) The quota of species i is not fully utilized, that
is h∗i = l∗i < l¯i, if and only if c∗i ≥ pi.
Proof. See Appendix 8.2
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The intuition behind the result stated in Proposition 2 is simple. Since landings can
not exceed the quota, discarding occurs if the profit maximizing harvest exceeds the landing
quota. Conversely, if the harvest lies below the quota discarding is suboptimal with non-
negative dockside prices. Further, if the quota for species i falls in the discard set its marginal
harvesting cost is negative. Therefore, the overall costs may be lowered by increasing the
species i harvest above l¯i. In this case, the fishermen will land what is permissible and
discard the rest after interception. The harvest of species i is increased to the point where
the cost savings are exhausted, i.e., ci(l∗ + d∗, x) = 0. Beyond this level, a marginal unit of
harvest has a positive cost (ci > 0) but no benefits since it has to be thrown back into the
sea.
If the marginal cost evaluated at the landing constraint of species i is above its dockside
price, the fisherman chooses to harvest and land less than the quota announced by the
manager; the profit maximizing harvest equates marginal cost with the dockside price. In
such cases the landing constraint is slack. However, if ci evaluated at l¯i is positive but below
(or equal to) the species’ dockside price, the quota is fully utilized. In such cases, no discard
occurs.
A final observation is that if there are positive discards of species i fish for some l¯, further
reductions in the species i quota will have no eﬀect on species i mortality. This is because
the catch h∗i that minimizes fishing costs does not change if solely l¯i is lowered; fishermen
will continue intercepting h∗i , land l¯i, and discard the rest, h∗i − l¯i. The intuition follows
from Figure 2 for the two-species case. Under our assumption that all discarded fish die,
mortality is unaﬀected by further reductions in the species i landings constraint, thus only
fishing revenues decline.
The results above imply that equilibrium lease prices of species-specific landings permits
inform whether or not discarding occurs. Assume that a well-functioning quota lease market
exists and let r = (r1..., rm) denote the vector of equilibrium quota lease prices. Then
Proposition 2 leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If fishermen can freely discard fish at sea, the equilibrium lease price for
species i quota satisfies ri ∈ [0, pi], i = 1, ...,m.
ri =
(
pi − c∗i , if pi ≥ c∗i
0, if pi < c∗i
Proof. See Appendix 8.2
To understand this result, observe that quota transferability implies an equilibrium con-
dition in which all gains from quota trading are exhausted. In equilibrium, the quota lease
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price will be bid up to the marginal profit that the fisherman would obtain by using the
quota himself. This condition may be written as
ri = pi − ci(l∗ + d∗, x), i = 1, ...,m. (3)
There are three possibilities to consider. If the manager sets a quota that exceeds the
profit maximizing harvest quantity, the quota does not bind and the corresponding lease
price will equal zero. On the other hand, if the manager announces a quota l¯ ∈ D(x),
fishermen will discard the species whose marginal harvest costs, evaluated at l¯, are negative.
Discarding of species i harvest occurs until ci(l¯ + d, x) = 0. At zero marginal cost, the
marginal profit from landing an additional unit of species i fish is just equal to the dockside
price. The remaining possibility is that the marginal cost of harvesting species i is positive
but lies below its dockside price. Here, the lease price will be strictly positive but less than
the species’ dockside price.
The implementable set of species-specific quotas. The decision problem of the
representative fisherman highlights that the species-specific quotas announced by the man-
ager may not be implementable for two reasons: (1) fishermen may optimally choose not to
utilize the full quota and (2) their optimal catch of some species may exceed its landings
quota if its discarding reduces overall costs. It is then crucial that the manager be aware of
the implementable set of quotas. Such sets are defined by Proposition 2.
Definition 1. Let IQ(x, p) denote the manager’s set of implementable target harvest levels.
Then
IQ(x, p) =
©
h¯ ≤ x; h¯ 6= D(x); pi ≥ ci(h¯, x), i = 1, ...,m.
ª
.
The first condition states that aggregate harvest cannot exceed the available stock. The
second indicates that implementable harvest vectors can not be elements of the discard
set, and the third rules out harvest slacks. Definition 1 will be critical for formulating the
manager’s dynamic problem to be studied in the next section.
3.2. Landing taxes. Under landing taxes, the target harvest level is implemented by
adjusting the net price of landed fish. Let τ = (τ 1, τ 2, ..., τm), where τ i denotes per-unit land-
ings tax for species i fish.15 A representative fishermen then chooses landings and discards
to maximize profits:
π(p, x, τ) = max
l≥0, d≥0
{(p− τ) l − c(l + d, x)}.
15The per-unit taxes and transfers can be balanced through lump-sum taxes/transfers on all fishermen.
These details are however immaterial for our analysis.
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The solution to this problem can be summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Landing taxes can not implement a harvest target h ∈ D (x) ; in such cases
optimal discarding of some species i occurs with c∗i = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 8.3
Why can landing taxes not eliminate discards? To answer this, suppose the manager
wishes to implement a harvest target that is an element of the discard set, at which the
marginal cost (without discarding) is negative for some species i. Even if the manager taxes
away all the revenues, i.e., set τ i = pi, the discards will still occur as the marginal cost of
harvesting species i at an amount less than the optimum is negative. Setting a landings tax
such that τ i > pi is clearly not feasible; fishermen will simply discard all species i fish to
avoid the revenue loss from landing it.
On the other hand, a negative landings tax, i.e., per-unit subsidy can be used to encourage
fishermen to harvest a larger quantity than would be harvested at dockside price pi. This
allows landing taxes to implement harvest targets that would be slack under a species-specific
quota regulation.
The implementable set under landing taxes. Proposition 3 allows us to define the
set of harvest levels that can be implemented under landing taxes.
Definition 2. Let IT (x) denote the manager’s set of implementable harvest targets. Then
IT (x) = {h ≤ x, h /∈ D(x)} .
In contrast to the implementable set under a species-specific quotas (see Definition 1)
the restriction that marginal costs at the desired harvest levels be less than the prices is no
longer required. Consequently, the implementable set is independent of prices.
3.3. Value-based revenue quotas. The last regulation we study is a value-based har-
vest revenue quota. Under this regime the manager sets an upper bound for dockside rev-
enues. Fishermen in turn choose a harvest vector such that the revenue cap is not exceeded.
Turner (1995) shows that discarding is never part of a profit maximizing fishing strategy
under this regime.
Proposition 4. With strictly positive prices, the necessary conditions for revenue con-
strained profit maximization are given as
c1(h, x)
p1
=
c2(h, x)
p2
= ... =
cm(h, x)
pm
≤ 1
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Proof. See Turner (1995).
The intuition for these results is straightforward. If the ratio of marginal costs to marginal
revenues were not the same across all species, profits could be increased by tilting the output
mix toward those species with a lower marginal cost-to-price ratio. The prices however must
be at least as large as the marginal costs; otherwise, profits can be increased by reducing
harvest quantities. The last inequality in Proposition 4 follows as a result.
The necessary condition can be expressed alternatively as
−pi
pj
= − ci(h, x)
cj(h, x)
,
This condition states that for any two species, the rate of product transformation,−ci(h, x)/cj(h, x),
equals the negative price ratio of the two products. Expressed in this form, it is easy to see
why there is no discarding under a value-based quota. Since prices are nonnegative, the rate
of product transformation is non-positive. But this is the condition required for h /∈ D(x),
i.e., revenue-constrained optimal harvest is never an element of the discard set.16
The implementable set under a value-based quota. A downside of a revenue
quota regime, recognized by Turner (1995), is that the manager has limited control over the
aggregate harvest in the multiple species fishery. Proposition 4 allows us to formally define
these limitations.
Definition 3. Let IV (x, p) denote the implementable set of harvest targets under a value-
based quota regulation. Then
IV (x, p) =
(
h ≤ x; pipj =
ci(h,x)
cj(h,x)
∀ i, j = 1, ...,m;
pi ≥ ci(h, x) ∀ i.
)
.
3.4. The ranking of implementable sets. We have identified the set of harvest vectors
that can be implemented under three regulatory regimes. It is useful to compare these
implementable sets with a benchmark that a hypothetical sole owner of the fishery would
face. Observe that a sole owner’s implementable harvest set is constrained only by the
available stock:
ISO(x) = {h ≤ x} .
The following Lemma ranks the regimes in terms of the restrictions they impose on the
implementable harvest sets.
16If the dockside price for some species i is zero, fishermen will choose a harvest vector such that ci(h, x) =
0. In this case, a positive quantity of species i fish is intercepted by the gear (otherwise targeting costs
would be required to avoid this species). In the absence of discard costs the fisherman is indiﬀerent between
landing and discarding the fish at sea.
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Lemma 1.
IV (x, p) v IQ(x, p) v IT (x) v ISO(x).
Proof. See Appendix 8.4.
The set of implementable harvests under the three regulatory regimes are illustrated
graphically in Figure 3. The curve with the broken lines is a representative iso-cost curve
(also a harvest possibilities frontier for a given input bundle), c(h, x) = c, with stock levels
x1 = x2 for the two species. The iso-cost curves in the example of the figure are homothetic
(see (1)) and the points that demarcate elements of the eﬃcient harvest set and harvests
exhibiting positive marginal rates of product transformation fall along the rays 0 − a and
0− b. Observe that c1 = 0 along 0− a while c2 = 0 along 0− b. Thus the discard region for
species 1 lies to the left of 0− a (i.e., the triangular region 0− x2 − a), while for species 2
the discard region lies to the right of 0− b (i.e., the triangular region 0− x1 − b).
Figure 3: Implementable harvest sets
For the sole owner, the only constraint on implementable harvest choices is that they
not exceed the available stock, i.e., hi ≤ xi, for i = 1, 2. Thus, the sole owner is able to
implementable all harvests in the rectangle 0 − x2 − d − x1. Under a landings tax and
species-specific quota regulation, implementability is constrained further by the requirement
that marginal costs be nonnegative. Thus, the landing tax implementable set shrinks to
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0− a− d− b− 0. Species-specific quotas face a further constraint that dockside prices must
exceed marginal costs. To demonstrate, we assume that the dockside price of species 2 is
low. Suppose p2 < c2(h, x) in the region a − g − f , i.e., where h2 is relatively high. The
implication is that with a low species 2 price only harvests in the region 0− f − g−d− b−0
can be implemented under a species-specific quota. Finally, under a revenue-based quota,
implementable harvests must satisfy c1(h, x)/p1 = c2(h, x)/p2 < 1. With p2 < p1 minimizing
the cost of attaining a revenue target requires c2(h, x) < c1(h, x). For the case of equal
stock abundance across the two species, fishermen will harvest a mix which satisfies h2 <
h1. Homotheticity implies that the ratio of marginal costs is scale invariant and thus the
implementable harvest set under a revenue-based quota is a ray such as 0− e in Figure 3.
By characterizing the implementable sets under the instruments of our interest, we have
identified the constraints on optimal harvest choices in each period. The optimal harvest
policy must additionally incorporate the dynamic biological aspects that stem from the stock
growth model in (2). This is the task we undertake now.
4. Optimal management under weak output disposability
Our objective in this section is twofold: first, to study rules, i.e., species-specific quotas,
taxes, revenue caps that maximize welfare within their respective regimes, and second, to
compare them to the rules chosen by a hypothetical sole owner, or equivalently, the solution
to the problem of a manager who can perfectly observe and control at-sea activities of the
fishermen. The task of ranking regulatory instruments turns out to be easier and is shown
below analytically. For computing constrained-optimal rules within each regulatory regime
however we resort to numerical solutions, in which the sole-owner’s harvest rules are used as
the benchmark for understanding and evaluating each alternative.
In the absence of discarding and the problem of harvest slacks, as would be the case for a
sole owner, the manager’s harvest target can be implemented simply by setting landings at
the optimal harvest levels. A manager may then wish to choose a harvest vector that falls in
the discard set or implies a harvest slack, if such a choice adjusts the stock in a way that yields
higher future returns. On the other hand, under the assumption that fishermen maximize
current period profits, the impacts of discarding on future payoﬀs are not internalized.17
The manager’s harvest plan that is an element of the discard set will then lead to wasteful
mortality of fish. The extent to which such divergent objectives of fishermen constrain the
17The assumption that fishermen are fully myopic is made to simplify the analysis. Arnason (1990)
examines conservation incentives of individual fishermen operating in a rights-based fisheries management
program.
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manager’s implementable aggregate harvests and reduce fishery value is of particular interest
in what follows.
Below, we first study a sole-owner problem. Following the bioeconomics literature, the
sole owner construct will provide a benchmark policy from which to assess the performance
of our three regulatory instruments which remain subject to the hidden action problem, i.e.,
unobserved discarding.
4.1. The sole owner problem. At the beginning of the harvest phase, the owner ob-
serves the available stock x and selects current harvest h. The management program can be
written as
V (s) = max
h∈ISO
{ph− c(h, x (s)) + β V (x (s)− h| {z }
s0
)}. (4)
The state vector in (4) is s which, by equation (2), determines current stock abundance x.
The control vector is s0 = x− h, and β is the discount factor where 0 < β < 1. The solution
to this problem is an escapement policy or equivalently a harvest policy that specifies s0 for
all possible states s. The maximized value of the fishery for a given state s is V (s).
Assuming an interior solution, the first order conditions with respect to the optimal
harvests can be written as
pi − ci = βVi(s0), i = 1 to m,
where Vi(s0) = ∂V (s0)/∂s0i. Intuitively, the LHS expresses the net benefit of a marginal
harvest of species i fish while the RHS represents its benefits if left in the sea. The Envelope
conditions are:
Vi (s) =
mX
j=1
µ
β Vj (s0)−
∂c(h, x)
∂xj
¶
∂xj
∂si
, i = 1 to m.
The marginal value of a unit of the escapement of species i equals the marginal benefit
that it brings by reducing current cost of harvesting through increased stocks of species
j = 1, ...,m, represented by the term
Pm
j=1−
∂c(h,x)
∂xj
∂xj
∂si
, plus its discounted marginal value in
the next period
Pm
j=1 β Vj (s
0) ∂xj∂si . The FOCs and the Envelope conditions can be combined
to yield (Clark, 1990; Flaaten, 1991)
pi − ci = β
mX
j=1
µ
pj − c0j −
∂c(h0, x0)
∂xj
¶
∂x0j
∂s0i
, i = 1 to m. (5)
The intuition directly follows from the ones oﬀered before. At the margin, a unit of species
i if harvested has a benefit given by the LHS. If instead it is left in the sea, it increases
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next period stock of species j by
∂x0j
∂s0i
, which in turn brings a marginal benefit −∂c(h0,x0)∂xj by
decreasing harvesting cost in the next period in addition to its direct marginal benefit of
pj − c0j when harvested in the next period. Aggregated over its impact on all species, the
RHS represents the discounted value of an unharvested unit of species i fish, or the user cost
of the species i stock.
Obviously, the sole owner will never discard any species if its dockside price is positive.
This however does not imply that the sole owner never chooses harvest bundles belonging
to the discard set. A relevant question to ask is: when will the optimal harvest be such that
the marginal cost for some species i is negative? The answer to this question is provided in
the numerical simulations to be discussed below.
4.2. Decentralized management. We now turn to the harvest policies that are im-
plementable under decentralized management. Although the manager cannot observe and
therefore cannot control at-sea fishing practices, he knows the decision rules of fishermen
and is fully aware of the harvest and thus fishing mortality outcomes under various forms of
regulation.
We know that the sole-owner can choose harvests within the discard set (although the
catch is never discarded/wasted). Would the manager also not like to do so under decentral-
ized management? Are there any future stock benefits that can accrue from such a harvest
choice? The following proposition addresses these questions.
Proposition 5. An optimal policy belongs to the implementable sets described by Defini-
tions 1 — 3; discarding is never a part of the optimal policy.
Proof. See Appendix 8.5.
To understand this result, first note that discarding is purely a deadweight social loss.
Second, allowing discards does not bring any other current or future benefit: fishermen will
discard exactly the amount dictated by their optimal decision rules contingent on the policy
regime in place. Then why not just allow them to land all the fish? If the manager wants a
higher mortality of particular species, possibly to enhance the growth of a competing species,
he may as well permit the fishermen to land the same for sale at the port by appropriately
designing quotas or landing taxes. If instead he wants to lower the mortality of a particular
species by lowering its target harvest, he has to ensure that the target harvest for other
species is chosen such that the full harvest vector is not an element of the discard set, i.e.,
that it be individually rational for the fishermen not to discard the species being protected.
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Similarly, in the species-specific quota regime, it is pointless to announce too high a
quota if it is never going to bind. Fishermen’s actual harvest choice (which in this case
equals landings) is what matters and the manager may as well announce the same as the
regulated quota.
Proposition 5 unambiguously informs us that the manager should restrict his choices to
implementable sets as described by Definitions 1 — 3. Recall that the harvesting problem
of the fishermen is assumed static. The manager therefore only needs to incorporate the
fishermen’s current period decision rule into the dynamic program. The manager’s problem
then takes the following form:
V R(s) = max
h∈IR
{ph− c(h, x (s)) + β V (x (s)− h}, (6)
where the superscript R in IR denotes the regulatory regime, i.e., R = Q,T,or V .
Our next result on ranking alternative regulatory regimes directly follows fromDefinitions
1 - 3.
Proposition 6. In terms of the value of the fishery, the regimes are ranked as
V SO ≥ V T ≥ V Q ≥ V V .
Proof. Directly follows from Lemma 1.
The intuition here is straightforward. Landing taxes oﬀer more implementable harvest
choices than do species-specific quotas. For example, under landing taxes the manager can
induce a relatively larger harvest of a particular species through appropriate subsidies. Under
a value-based quota regulation a single choice variable, the revenue cap, is used to control
multiple harvests and stocks; it is more restrictive than multi-dimensional species-specific
quotas.
From a policy perspective, the sole owner’s problem can be implemented if monitors were
placed on board and a system of penalties for discarding and/or rewards for targeting could
induce fishermen to harvest their allocated quotas including elements of the discard set.
Essentially then, monitoring will expand the harvest set to the sole owner’s implementable
set {h : h ≤ x}. Suppose the cost of such monitoring is Cobs. Then, relative to any other
regulatory regime with fisheries’ value V R, R ∈ {T,Q, V }, the monitored program can obtain
V SO − Cobs.
At this stage, a question to ask is under what conditions, e.g., the nature of the biological
interaction between fish species, the structure of the harvest technology, and relative prices
for landed fish, will the diﬀerences in performance of the three forms of regulation be most
pronounced. This is addressed in the next section.
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5. Numerical results
Neither the sole owner problem (see equation (4)) nor the management problem under alter-
native regulatory regimes (see equation (6)) can be solved analytically. In this section, we
use numerical methods to solve for the value function and the optimal management policies
under alternative regulatory regimes; the optimal policy employed by the sole owner serve as
a benchmark for all comparisons.18 The simulation exercises focus on the two-species case.
Prices and parameter values are listed below.
In addition to current stock abundance, the key determinants of these policies are (a)
relative dockside prices, (b) the nature of the ecological competition, and (c) the degree of
technological complementarity between the two harvested species. Below, we focus on each of
these factors in turn. Although the scenarios we consider are stylized examples of conditions
encountered in actual fisheries, they allow us to highlight the main insights pertinent to the
optimal management of multiple-species fisheries.
Competing species fishery with dockside price diﬀerential. We first examine
harvest policies for a competing-species fishery. We assume two species that are biologically
symmetric, with common intrinsic growth rate and common competition parameters. The
two species are assumed economically asymmetric with species 2 having a lower dockside
price; p2 = 13p1. We suppose that due to the price diﬀerential, the high-price stock has been
overfished while the low-price stock has been underfished relative to their respective steady
states. The challenge for the manager is to restore each stock to its constrained-optimal
steady state value.19
Figure 4 plots the sole owner policy (solid curves) and a second-best policy which is im-
plementable under a species-specific quota regulation (dashed curves). From top to bottom,
the panels in the figure show: (a) the stock of high-price species; (b) the stock of low-price
species; (c) the harvest of high-price species; (d) the harvest of low-price species; and (e) the
marginal costs for both species. Policies are shown for twenty four periods.
Consider first the stocks and harvests under the sole owner policy. The sole owner policy
calls for aggressive investment in the high price stock. The initial harvest of the high-price
species (panel (c)) is kept low, and the initial harvest of the low-price species (panel (d))
is set high. Note that positive harvests of both species are maintained. This is in sharp
contrast to a bang-bang approach to the steady state stock levels, which would call for zero
harvests when a stock is below its steady state value. Under a costly targeting technology,
18The numerical technique we use is value function iteration. The method is described in Judd (1998).
19Note that because implementable harvests diﬀer across regulatory regimes, steady states are in general
specific to the regime that is in place.
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Figure 4: Sole owner versus species-specific quota regime: Panels are: (a) high-price stock;
(b) low-price stock; (c) high-price harvest; (d) low-price harvest; (e) marginal harvest costs. Solid curves
depict the sole owner policy. Dashed curves depict the species-specific quota policy. Parameter values are
r1 = r2 = 1; α1 = α2 = 0.35; p1 = $1, p2 = $1/3; γ1 = γ2 = 0.25, and γs = 50.
the sole owner implicitly weighs the gains from setting catch shares that diﬀer significantly
from stock shares. More precisely, the date zero stock share for the high-price species is
0.272, whereas the catch share is 0.110 under the sole owner policy. Further reductions in
the high-price species harvest (or further increases in the harvest of the low-price species)
would move the stocks more rapidly toward their steady state values. The targeting costs
that would be required to implement this strategy however outweigh the benefits. This is
because the costly targeting technology requires an alignment of harvest and stock shares to
control targeting costs, which slows the transition to steady states.
The bottom panel of Figure 4 shows that the sole-owner marginal cost for the high-price
species is negative during the first five production periods. That is, aggressive harvest of the
low-price species with concurrent protection of the high-price species puts the sole owner’s
harvest vector in the discard set. It is clear that the sole-owner policy cannot be implemented
under decentralized management.
This is demonstrated for the species-specific quota results shown as the dashed curves
in Figure 4. Under second best, species-specific quotas, harvests in the discard set and har-
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vests that cause marginal costs to rise above the dockside price can not be implemented.
The bottom panel shows that indeed the marginal costs for each species (dashed lines) are
maintained at non-negative levels. Additionally, the low-price species marginal cost is main-
tained below its respective dockside price of $1/3. These constraints on implementability
impact the second best policy in predictable ways. First, harvest shares and stock shares
are closer in magnitude than their sole owner counterparts; the first period harvest share for
the high-price species is 0.238 (stock share is 0.272). Maintaining similar harvest and stock
shares keeps targeting costs low, as is required to avoid discarding.
We note that at the sole-owner steady state the low-price species marginal cost ($0.39)
exceeds the dockside price. The sole owner incurs losses at the margin in order to maintain
the low-price stock at low levels. This reduces ecological competition and allows a slightly
larger harvest of the high-price species along the transition path and at the steady state.
Under species-specific quotas fishermen are unwilling to harvest larger quantities of the low-
price species; ecological competition is maintained at a costlier level. As a result, the steady
state stock level for the high- and low- price species are respectively below and above their
sole-owner counterparts.
Finally, we see from the sole owner’s optimality conditions in Section 4 that a price below
marginal cost implies a negative shadow price for the fish stock; the presence of the low-price
species depresses the value of the fishery. However, further reduction in the low-price stock is
also costly. The growth characteristics of competing fish species explains this result. As the
low-price species’ stock is reduced, less intraspecies competition increases per-period growth.
A low stock level and increased per-period harvest create a mismatch between the stock and
harvest shares, a condition that raises targeting costs. Thus, while the sole owner would
prefer less inter-species competition, it is too costly to further reduce the low-priced stock.
Figure 5 depicts the sole owner policy (solid lines) and a policy that is implementable
under landing tax regulations (dashed lines). As above the five panels in the figure are (from
top to bottom) (a) the stock of high-price species, (b) the stock of low-price species, (c) the
harvest of high-price species, (d) the harvest of low-price species, (d) and the marginal costs
for high- and low-price species.
The results show that while stocks and harvests under landings taxes follow a diﬀerent
transition path, they reach the same steady state values as under the sole owner policy.
Unlike species-specific quotas, the regulator can subsidize the harvest of the low price species
to reduce its stock and reduce ecological competition in the fishery. The regulator continues
to face a constraint that harvests not be contained in the discard set. This aﬀects harvest
choices in the early periods when the stocks are farthest from their steady state values. The
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Figure 5: Sole Owner vs. Landings Tax Policy. Panels are: (a) high-price stock; (b) low-price
stock; (c) high-price harvest; (d) low-price harvest; (e) marginal harvest costs. Solid curves depict the sole
owner policy. Dashed curves depict the landing tax policy.
constraints on implementability slows the transition to the steady state stock levels.
Under a value-based quota regulation, our results show that the high-price species catch
share is considerably larger than under the sole owner policy.20 Recall that under a value-
based quota fishermen’s harvests are chosen to equate the ratio of marginal costs and prices,
which in this example are 3 to 1 in favor of the high-price species. Because fishermen
focus their fishing eﬀort on the high-price species, the high-price steady state stock under
the value-based quota is 75% of the sole-owner value. Fishermen also harvest less of the
low-price species under the value-based quota regulation; the low-price steady-state stock is
346% of the sole owner level. Steady state harvests of the high- and low-price species are
respectively 74.8% and 246.9% of their sole owner counterparts. The lack of control over
individual species harvests and stocks reduces the value of the fishery considerably. Fishery
20A figure showing the value-based quota policy results adds few additional insights, and to save space is
not included. The figure is available from the authors on request.
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value under the value-based quota (evaluated at the date zero stock levels) is 91.6% of the
sole owner value. In comparison, fishery values under species-specific quota and landings tax
regulations are, respectively, 99.4% and 99.7% of the sole-owner value.
Predator-prey fishery. Our second management scenario considers a predator-prey
fishery. In this example, the two species are economically symmetric, with equal prices for
both species. We assume that both stocks are initially below their respective steady state
values, and thus stock rebuilding is called for.
Figure 6: Sole Owner vs. alternative regulatory regimes in a predator-prey fishery. Parameter
values in this example are: r1 = r2 = 1; α1 = 0.4, α2 = −0.4; p1 = p2 = $1; γ1 = γ2 = 0.25;
and γs = 75. Panels are: (a) prey stock; (b) predator stock; (c) prey harvest; (d) predator harvest; and
(e) marginal harvest costs. Solid curves depict the sole owner policy. Dashed curves depict the landings tax
and species-specific quota policies.
Figure 6 shows from top to bottom, (a) the prey stock, (b) the predator stock, (c) the
prey harvest, (d) the predator harvest, and (e) the marginal costs. The solid curve depicts
the sole owner policy and the dashed curve depicts both the species-specific and landings
tax regimes. Dockside prices are set suﬃciently high and harvests are low during the stock
rebuilding phase. Thus there are no harvest slacks under the species-specific quota and thus
the two second best policies coincide.
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With a predator-prey fishery there is growth complementarity among the two species
since a higher prey stock enhances growth of the predator. Both stocks are initially low,
and their respective shadow prices are high, calling for aggressive investment in each stock,
i.e., low initial harvest. With low initial stock abundance there is minimal intraspecies
competition and high growth rates. Since the growth of the predator increases with the size
of the prey stock, the incentive to invest in the prey stock is further strengthened. Notice
that with rapid growth both stocks reach their steady state values by the sixth period.
Under the sole owner policy the prey stock (top panel) is maintained at a higher level
than under the second best policy. Comparing catch and stock shares reveals that the sole
owner catch share of the prey species is half or less of the catch share under decentralized
management. The bottom panel in the figure confirms that the diﬀerence between the two
policies is due to the discarding constraint. Under the sole owner policy marginal harvesting
costs are negative for the prey species indicating such harvests in the discard set during the
approach to and at the steady state (see bottom panel). In contrast, the second-best policies
are constrained to target harvests with only non-negative marginal costs. With the exception
of the steady state prey species stock, which under the second best policy is 83.9% of the
sole owner steady state value, the no-discarding constraint results in fairly small diﬀerences
in the two policies. The value of the fishery under the second-best policy is 97.8% of the sole
owner value.
Targeting costs and regulation. Here we investigate how the relative desirability of
the three regulatory regimes vis-à-vis the sole owner’s policies change when the targeting
costs, as captured by the parameter γs in the harvesting technology (1), is varied. Over a
range of γs = 0 to γs = 400 and under the three alternative regulatory regimes, Figure 7
below displays percentage losses in the value (relative to the sole-owner value) of a predator-
prey fishery with a 3:1 dockside price diﬀerential in favor of the prey species.21 Consistent
with Proposition 6, the percentage losses are largest under the value-based quota, followed
by species-specific quotas, and then landings taxes.
At γs = 0, landing taxes and species-specific quotas do as well as the sole owner policy.
Observe that when γs = 0, the two harvests are technologically independent. Consequently,
with strictly positive marginal costs for each species at any harvest level, discarding never
occurs. In this case the sole owner plans can be implemented by landing taxes, or by
species-specific quotas as long as the quotas are fully utilized by the fishermen, i.e., dockside
21Losses are calculated at the average of five escapement states: s1 high and s2 low; s1 low and s2 high;
both escapement levels low, both high and both at intermediate levels. Losses in fishery value were similar
when evaluated at other escapement states.
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Figure 7: Lost fishery value due to unobservable at-sea discards. Parameter values are r1 = r2 =
1; α1 = 0.4; α2 = −0.4; p1 = $1, p2 = $1/3, γ1 = γ2 = 0.25.
prices exceed marginal costs along the equilibrium path (which indeed is the case in our
parametric example). While landing taxes and species-specific quotas can implement the
sole-owner’s harvests, to do so with the value-based quota is not possible. Under the latter,
any revenue quota leads to a vector of harvests that equalize the ratios of marginal costs to
prices across all species. In general the implementable harvests are not what a sole-owner,
who weights intertemporal ecological dynamics equally importantly, are likely to choose.
Only in exceptional cases, e.g., a symmetric fishery with stocks level at their steady state
values, the two may coincide. Thus for γs = 0, a value-based quota regime performs poorly.22
Figure 7 shows that as γs gets suﬃciently large, the percentage welfare losses relative to
the sole owner fishery converge under each form of regulation, and decline toward zero. Intu-
itively, as γs →∞ targeting is not possible and harvest proportions are fixed by technology.
The ratio of harvests must equal the ratio of their respective stocks, since with any other
target harvest ratio, the costs become infinite. The manager has no choice other than to set
22We note that losses under a value-based quota in a fully symmetric fishery were much smaller (less than
0.35% of the sole owner fishery value). Intuitively, in a economically and biologically symmetric fishery the
fishermen’s choices roughly coincide with the management preferences. Most real world fisheries are however
likely to be asymmetric and, therefore, losses under value-based quotas are also likely to be significant.
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harvest shares equal to stock shares, irrespective of the regulatory regime that is in place.
The same is true for the sole owner, who may however sometimes want to harvest quantities
at which the species-specific quotas may not bind. This can be redressed through landing
taxes. Similarly, as harvest proportions must equal stock proportions, sole owner quantities
can now be implemented by a revenue cap, as long as it binds.
It is interesting to note that while landing taxes and species-specific quotas replicate the
first best under cross-species technological independence as well as a fixed harvest proportions
technology, it is for the intermediate ranges of γs, i.e., costly targeting, that performance
relative to the sole owner policy declines. In the current example, the percentage loss under
landings taxes remains small for low values of γs, e.g., for γs between 0 and 100 losses are
less than 1%. Due to harvest slacks, losses are higher under species-specific quotas than
under landings taxes, although they do not exceed 3% of the sole owner value.
The non-monotonic variation of welfare losses under landing taxes and/or species-specific
quotas with respect to γs can be explained as follows. First recall that an increase in γs
expands the discard set, or equivalently, further constrains implementable harvests. From
the sole owner’s perspective, when targeting costs are low, intertemporal ecological consid-
erations dominate leading some preferred harvest choices to fall in the discard set. As γs
increases, the discard set expands and the sole-owner’s harvests fall more often into this set.
Thus as long as γs is not too high, increases in its value cause further divergence between the
sole owner harvest policy and the second best policies under landing taxes and/or species-
specific quotas. As a result, welfare losses under decentralized regulation increase. On the
other hand, for high values of γs technological considerations dominate the sole owners’ har-
vest choices since the cost of selecting a harvest bundle with shares that diﬀer from stock
shares is excessive. A further increase in γs reduces the likelihood that the sole owner’s
choices fall in the discard set. In other words, the sole owner’s preferred harvests and the
implementable harvests under regulatory regimes are more aligned.
6. Conclusion
This paper studies the management of a multiple species fishery under cross-species ecosys-
tem interaction as well as cross-species technological interaction. Fishermen in practice ad-
just gear type, bait, fishing times, and fishing locations to influence the mix of harvested fish
species. We introduce a technology under which targeting of individual species is possible but
costly, and for which costs rise as the mix of targeted species diverges from a no-target-cost
harvest mix implied by the composition of stocks in the sea. This representation captures
economies of scope present in real world harvest technologies, and permits a novel charac-
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terization of the incentives to discard fish at sea in regulated multiple-species fisheries. We
make a fair amount of analytical progress in ranking alternative regulatory regimes, namely,
species-specific quotas, landing taxes, and value-based quotas. For studying optimal rules
within each regulatory regime and comparing their performance to the harvest rule chosen
by a sole owner, we solve related dynamic management problems using numerical methods.
A general conclusion from the analysis is that harvest policies should be chosen such
that targeting costs implied under the regulated aggregate harvests are not too large. In
our model, this requires that the share of the harvest of individual fish species is aligned
with the share of their respective stock abundance in the sea. Divergent catch and stock
shares introduce an incentive for fishermen to discard fish and save resources that would
otherwise be spent in sticking to the target. We identify ecological conditions (e.g., compet-
ing species versus predator-prey fisheries), and economic conditions (technology and relative
prices) under which discarding imposes significant constraints on management choices. Sec-
ond best management policies avoid the discarding problem through prudent choice of the
target harvests. These policies balance ecological and technological interactions among fish
species along the approach path to and at the steady state harvest and stock levels. The
results provide important guidance for the management of real world fisheries for which stock
rebuilding is often required, and in particular, when one or a few stocks are depleted while
others are healthy.
The focus of this paper has been on harvesting and discards of fish species which have
consumptive value. Incidental bycatch of sea birds, sea turtles, dolphins and other marine
mammals poses a serious threat to the viability of commercial fisheries. Our model can be
readily used to address the bycatch problem of species with non-consumptive values, and
to study losses that arise when sea birds and mammals are killed during fishing operations.
The insights gained in the preceding sections continue to apply.
We have only considered variable harvesting costs in the paper. In practice, fishermen do
incur fixed costs in acquiring and maintaining fishing boats and accessories. In a dynamic
set up, which is the case in our paper, including capital in the model and costly capital
adjustment introduces an additional choice of optimal capital and an additional state vari-
able. While this is an important aspect of optimal fisheries management, it complicates
our analysis and we feel adds few additional insights to the discard problem and optimal
management of multiple species fish stocks. It is our conjecture that having fixed capital
will introduce policy persistence with respect to the level of optimal harvests (Singh et al.,
2006). However, inter-species trade oﬀs, and therefore discards, will remain very much at
the core of the problem since variable costs will still depend on the relative stock abundance.
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As a result, our qualitative results will continue to hold under fixed costs.
Another objection could be raised towards our assumption of perfect observability of fish
stocks and fishing costs. If these factors are not observed, will our results, particularly the
relative ranking of alternative regimes, continue to hold? Specifically, Turner (1997) shows
that value-based quotas eliminate discards under unobservability of stocks and individual
costs (technology). Our take is that even with unobservability of fundamentals, some market
mechanisms can be exploited for the choice of appropriate regulatory regime. For example,
suppose regulators who are implementing a species-specific quota regime have incomplete
information about abundance and costs. Our results show that quota lease prices, which are
typically observable, reveal vital information about discarding behavior and harvest slacks.
One may be able to resolve the multiple-species management problem under unobservability
of fundamentals through an appropriate mechanism design. This is a promising area for
future research.
Our results contribute to a growing literature that acknowledges the importance of incor-
porating ecosystem (biological) interactions into the design of fisheries management policies
(Brodziak and Link, 2002; Pikitch, et. al 2004; US Commission on Ocean Policy, 2004; Pew
Oceans Commission, 2003). The results of this paper suggest that considering technological
interactions among multiple fish species is equally important. Management policies that ig-
nore technological interdependencies and the costs of targeting individual fish species within
multiple-species fish complexes could aggravate discarding and reduce fishery value.
An increasingly popular approach for addressing discards in multiple-species fisheries is
to penalize fishermen if they discard fish. These programs are enforced with extremely costly
on-board observer programs (NOAA, 2006). This paper shows that an alternative solution
to the discarding problem is to select target harvest levels that are not contained in the
discard set. In other words, with prudent choice of the harvest target, there will be no
incentive to discard and no need for on-board monitoring. Our model can be used to weigh
the costs and benefits of these two approaches. The benefit of on-board observers is that the
set of implementable target harvests is expanded to include harvests in the discard set. This
allows the manager to implement the sole owner harvest policy. The enhanced value of the
fishery under the sole owner policy, less the added cost of placing observers on board, could
be weighed against the value of the fishery managed under a second best harvest policy.
Calibrating the model of this paper to an actual fishery would be a step forward in this
direction.
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8. Appendix
The cost function in 1 is a special case of
c (h, x) =
£
1 + κ
Pm
i=1 γs,i [θi − χi(ϕi)]
2¤ ∙Pm
i=1
γi
xi
hηii
¸
, (7)
where θi = hi/(h1+ ...+hm) is the species i catch share, ϕi = xi/(x1+ ...+xm) is the species
i stock share, γs,i is the specialization cost parameter for species i. When m = 2, κ =
1
4
,
γs,1 = γs,2 = γs, and χi(ϕi) = ϕi, the cost function in 7 simplifies to 1.
8.1. Proof of Proposition 1. Without any loss of generality, fix h1 = h¯1 > 0 and
x2
x1
= δ. Let r = h2h¯1 . Then, after some algebra, it can be shown that
c2 =
∂c (h, x)
∂h2
=
h¯η−11
x1
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⎣ −
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γ2
δ r
η
¤
γs
¡
1
1+r −
1
1+δ
¢
1
(1+r)2
+
h
1 + 1
2
γs
¡
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1+r −
1
1+δ
¢2i ηγ2 rη−1δ
⎤
⎦
Notice that the second term is positive for all r > 0, whereas the first term is negative for
all r < δ, equal to zero for r = δ, and positive for all r > δ. Thus, for r = 0, i.e., h2 = 0, the
second term equals zero and c2 < 0, whereas for r = δ, c2 > 0. Further, notice that the first
term is monotonically increasing in r. Then , by continuity, there exists rˆ < δ, such that
c2 < 0 for all r < rˆ. Equivalently, there exists hˆ2 < h¯1 x2x1 such that for h2 < hˆ2, c2 < 0.
What is the sign of marginal costs for r ∈ [rˆ, δ]? With our choice of parameters
{γ1, γ2, γs, η} , we numerically find that the function is well behaved and the marginal cost
crosses zero only once, in which case indeed c2 > 0 for all h2 > hˆ2 (see Section 5 in the text).
8.2. Proof of Proposition 2. The Lagrangian for a representative fisherman’s problem
under species-specific quota regime is
L = p · l − c(l + d, x)− λ · (l − l¯),
where λ ∈ Rm+ is a vector of Lagrange multipliers. Necessary conditions for optimal landings
and discards, denoted l∗ and d∗, respectively, are
pi − ci(l∗ + d∗, x)− λi ≤ 0, “ = j if l∗i > 0; λi
¡
l∗i − l¯i
¢
= 0, i = 1, ...,m, (8a)
−ci(l∗ + d∗, x) ≤ 0, d∗i ci(l∗ + d∗, x) = 0, i = 1, ...,m, (8b)
l∗i ≤ l¯i, i = 1, ...,m, di ≥ 0 i = 1, ...,m, (8c)
First, suppose d∗i > 0. Then equation (8b) requires c∗i = 0. Then, from (8a), λi ≥ pi.
If pi < 0, l∗i = 0 ≤ l¯i and λi = 0 > pi. If pi = 0, then l∗i ∈
£
0, l¯i
¤
and λi = pi = 0;
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here fishermen are indiﬀerent between discarding all of the catch or landing the permissible
amount. If pi > 0, then λi = pi > c∗i = 0 and l∗i = l¯i. Thus, whenever l∗i < l¯i, λi = 0 and
pi ≤ c∗i .
Now, suppose d∗i = 0.Then equation (8b) requires c∗i > 0. If pi < 0, l∗i = 0 ≤ l¯i, λi = 0,
and from (8a) pi < c∗i . If pi = 0, then l∗i > 0 is not consistent with no discards, i.e., c∗i > 0,
because by reducing li profits can be increased. Finally, if l∗i = l¯i, then pi > λi = pi− c∗i > 0.
Irrespective of whether discards occur or not, l∗i < l¯i if and only if pi ≤ c∗i .
The implications for discarding are summarized in the vector λ. If pi < 0, λi = 0. If
pi ≥ 0, λi ∈ [0, pi]
If quotas are traded in a lease market, it can be shown that the lease price of species i
with pi > 0 equals its equilibrium marginal profits:
ri =
(
pi − c∗i , if pi ≥ c∗i
0, if pi < c∗i
Then, it follows from the above analysis that ri = λi.
8.3. Proof of Proposition 3. Define pˆ ≡ p− τ . The fisherman takes pˆ as given. Under
landings taxes the fishermen has no restriction on landing all of his catch h. The Lagrangian
for this problem is:
L = pˆ · l − c(l + d, x).
The first order necessary conditions are
pˆi − ci(l∗ + d∗, x) ≤ 0, “ = j if l∗i > 0 i = 1, ...,m, (9a)
−ci(l∗ + d∗, x) ≤ 0, d∗i ci(l∗ + d∗, x) = 0, i = 1, ...,m. (9b)
Thus, discard occurs if ci(l∗ + d∗, x) = 0. Notice further that any harvest target on the
discard set, i.e., h such that ci < 0, can not be implemented by the manager since it will
require pˆi < 0. But then l∗i = 0 and then d∗i = h∗i .
8.4. Proof of Lemma 1. From Definitions 1 and 2, it directly follows that IQ(x, p) v
IT (x). Further, h in IV implies that h 6∈ D (x) (see Section 3.3). Moreover, IV constrains
pi ≥ ci. These two together generate IQ(x, p). A further restriction under IV is that cipi =
cj
pj
for all i and j. Therefore, IV (x, p) v IQ(x) v IT (x) v ISO(x). The last of these relations is
obvious.
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8.5. Proof of Proposition 5. For the revenue-based quota the result is obvious. The
manager is constrained to choose from the set described by Definition 3. For the other two
cases it is useful to think of a two stage problem. Let us consider the species-specific quota
regime first. Given stock vector x, the manager announces a policy vector of permissible
landings l¯ that leads to fishermen’s choice of harvest vector h∗
¡
x,l¯
¢
= h (x, h∗), where
h∗i ≤ l¯i for species with no discards and h∗i = l¯i + d∗i for species with discard. What is the
best l¯ that the manager can choose? Let h∗
¡
x, l¯
¢
= l∗
¡
x, l¯
¢
+ u∗
¡
x, l¯
¢
. If u∗i
¡
x, l¯
¢
> 0,
d∗i
¡
x, l¯
¢
= u∗i
¡
x, l¯
¢
, i.e., there is discarding of species i. On the other hand, if u∗i
¡
x, l¯
¢
< 0,
h∗i ≤ l¯i, the quota of species i does not bind. Recall that the harvesting problem of the
fishermen is static. The manager therefore only needs to incorporate fishermen’s current
period’s decision rules into his own dynamic program, which can now be written as
V (s) = max
l¯
{
mX
i=1
pil∗i
¡
x (s) , l¯
¢
+ Iiu∗i
¡
x (s) , l¯
¢
− c(h∗
¡
x (s) , l¯
¢
, x (s))
+β V (x (s)− h∗
¡
x (s) , l¯
¢}. (10)
where Ii is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 if u∗i ≤ 0; otherwise Ii = 0. We
show that Ii = 1 for all i. Suppose not, i.e. ∃ an i 3 Ii = 0. Then d∗i = u∗i > 0. Then the
fishermen’s decision rules imply that d∗i = h∗i − l¯i and l∗i
¡
x, l¯i
¢
= l¯i. An observation of (10)
makes clear that by letting l¯i increase to h∗i the manager can strictly increase V (s) which
contradicts (that it maximizes) the RHS while fishermen’s harvest rules h∗ = h∗
¡
x, l¯
¢
=
h∗ (x, h∗) are unaﬀected by this increase. Similarly, if u∗i < 0, i.e., species i quota is slack,
then by decreasing l¯i to h∗i for all l¯i > h∗i , the fishermen’s decision rules are unaﬀected, and
the RHS of dynamic program remains unchanged.
A similar argument goes through for landing taxes. Let h∗ (x, τ) denote the harvest
decision rule of the fishermen. Then the dynamic program of the manager is:
V (s) = max
pˆ
{
mX
i=1
pil∗i (x (s) , pˆ)− c(h∗ (x (s) , pˆ) , x (s))
+β V (x (s)− h∗ (x (s) , pˆ))};
pˆ = p− τ .
We know from the fishermen’s decision rules that l∗i (x, pˆ < 0) = l∗i (x, 0) = 0 and d∗i (x, pˆ < 0) =
h∗i (x, pˆ < 0) = h∗i (x, 0) > 0 if and only if τ i > pi since the eﬀective dockside price for fish-
ermen is zero. Setting τ infinitesimally below p reverses the fishermen’s decision rules, i.e.,
l∗i (x, 0+) = h∗i (x, 0+) and d∗i (x, 0+) = 0. Thus, allowing discards can not be optimal.
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